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HAVE THE PRISON DOORS BEEN OPENED?-DURESS AND
NECESSITY AS DEFENSES TO PRISON ESCAPE
Traditionally, the courts have been exceedingly reluctant to inter-
fere with the internal operations of prisons.' Instead, the courts have
observed a "hands off" policy,2 primarily because of their fear of sub-
verting prison discipline, their observance of the separation of powers
doctrine, and their lack of expertise in penal matters.3
In recent years, however, the violent atmosphere of the modern
prison4 has attracted growing public attention, which has been reflected
in a corresponding judicial involvement in penal affairs. Yet, while
the courts increasingly have held that intolerable and inhumane condi-
tions may be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment,5 there
has been, until very recently,6 no comparable acknowledgment of a
prisoner's right to escape from such conditions.
Thus, escapees from prison rarely have been able to invoke suc-
cessfully common law defenses, including duress and necessity. The
courts have feared that endorsement of any defenses to escape would
lead to a "rash of escapes" 7 rationalized by allegations of threats, as-
saults, and other prison horrors.
Within the last few years a number of courts have abandoned the
orthodox majority position, and have held that some defense may be
available to those defendants charged with escape from prison. The
first few courts to do so acknowledged the availability of the defense of
duress;' the more recent cases have focused on necessity.9
While the new trend towards recognition of these defenses now
appears to be firmly entrenched in judicial doctrine, only a very few
1. See Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners Grievances', 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175,
181-85 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goldfarb & Singer]; Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners."
The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1962); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts. A Cri-
tique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Beyond the Ken].
2. The phrase originated in FRITCH, CIVIL RIGHTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INMATES 31 (1961)
(document prepared for the Federal Bureau of Prisons). Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 1, at 181.
3. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 1, at 181-82.
4. Over twice as many violent crimes are committed in prison per capita as in society at
large. Note, Duress and the Prison Escape: A New Use for an Old Defense, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
1062, 1069-70 (1972) [hereinafter cited as A New Use].
5. See text accompanying notes 11-29 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 80-146 infra.
7. People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 303, 170 N.W.2d 916, 918 (1969).
8. See text accompanying notes 80-101 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 102-146 infra.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
defendants actually have succeeded in getting their defenses to the jury.
Most defendants have been unable to satisfy the strict criteria which the
courts have established to limit the availability of the duress and neces-
sity defenses. The creation of these qualifications indicates that even
those courts which are willing to acknowledge such defenses for prison
escapees are reluctant to make those defenses more than minimally
available.
The recent Illinois case of People v. Unger' may have polarized
the judiciary's approach to this issue. All previous cases had empha-
sized the severe limitations to any available defenses. Unger's ap-
proach, in contrast, was much more expansive; the necessity defense it
made accessible was unrestricted by specific preconditions. It remains
to be seen how extensively the Unger rationale will be followed.
This note will survey briefly the development of the recognition of
a prisoner's constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. It then will examine the common law defenses of necessity
and duress and their applicability to prison escape cases. It confronted
the issue of whether to establish the availabilty of the defenses of duress
and necessity for prison escapees. Finally this note will examine the
changing policy considerations underlying these decisions and consider
the validity of the limited versus the expansive approaches to the avail-
ability of these offenses.
DEVELOPMENT OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS
The traditional attitude of the judiciary towards penal matters is
expressed by a policy of judicial abstention referred to as the "hands
off" doctrine. Correctional administrators have been given de facto
autonomy to manage penal institutions as they have seen fit, and the
courts have declined to review those policies. Some courts have gone
so far as to deny that they have the power or the jurisdiction to examine
the administration of penal institutions. " Thus, prisoners have been
denied a forum in which to assert their rights and voice complaints
regarding prison conditions and prisoner treatment.
In recent years, however, the courts have come to recognize that
the traditional "hands off" doctrine should not preclude examination of
possible serious infringements of inmate rights.' 2 Much of the current
10. 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977).
11. Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 1, at 181. Various formulations of the "hands off" doc-
trine are catalogued in Beyond the Ken, supra note 1, at 508 n.12.
12. See 60 AM. JUR. 2d Penaland Correctional Institutions § 45 (1972). Several commenta-
tors argue that the "hands off" doctrine is no longer viable. See, e.g., Goldfarb & Singer, supra
NOTES AND COMMENTS
litigation has centered around the deplorable physical and emotional
circumstances concomitant with prison life. These intolerable condi-
tions have been assailed as violative of prisoners' constitutional rights.
Recent challenges by inmates to prison conditions have focused on the
eighth amendment, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment,"' 3
and the vast majority of modem decisions have allowed review of pris-
oner complaints which establish the possible existence of cruel and un-
usual punishment.' 4 The courts increasingly have held that certain
extreme conditions and practices in correctional institutions are indeed
unconstitutional.' 5 Thus, the courts have found violations of the eighth
amendment in the use of physical force,' 6 segregated confinement,' 7
inadequate medical treatment,' 8 and the denial of food.19
The epidemic of homosexual assaults and rapes in prisons,2" and
the inability of prison officials to contain this problem, 2' have forced
the courts to devote increasing attention to this aspect of prison life.
While no case yet has held that a prisoner has a constitutional right to
be free from homosexual assault, the courts have begun to recognize an
note 2; Note, Decency and Fairness.- An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV.
841 (1971).
13. The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
14. E.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971); Queen v. S. C. Dep't of Corrections, 307 F. Supp. 841
(D.S.C. 1970). Cf. Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971) (review allowed,
but court found insufficient facts in support of plaintiff's complaint).
15. In the leading case of Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (Holt II), in-
mates brought eight class action suits against the entire Arkansas penal system. In awarding the
plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief the court stated that while confinement itself is not cruel
and unusual punishment, it may be so under certain conditions: "Generally speaking, a punish-
ment that amounts to torture, or that is grossly excessive in proportion to the offense for which it is
imposed, or that is inherently unfair, or that is unnecessarily degrading, or that is shocking or
disgusting to people of reasonable sensitivity is a 'cruel and unusual' punishment." Id at 380.
16. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971) (prod-
ding and beating with sticks and belts, dragging along the ground, marking "X"s on prisoners'
backs, burning with matches, spitting, racial slurs); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D.
Va. 1971) (chained and handcuffed within cells without release to eat or urinate).
17. Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (prisoner put in solitary confine-
ment because he failed to sign a "safety sheet" before commencing work in prison shop--to show
he had read the safety rules); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962) (Black Mus-
lim segregated over two years because he violated "disorderly conduct" regulation by exercising
his right to preach religious tenets which many inmates found offensive).
18. Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971)
(guards forced prisoner to walk two weeks after surgery for infantile paralysis, which required
long convalescence with as little movement as possible, in complete disregard of hospital person-
nel warnings); Hirons v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1965) (prisoner was re-
fused surgery on jaw long after the doctor had recommended that an operation take place within
the "very near future").
19. Dearman v. Woodson, 429 F.2d 1288 (10th Cir. 1970) (no food for 50 1/2 hours).
20. See, e.g., documentation of a Philadelphia study in Davis, Sexual Assaults in the Phila-
delphia Prison System, in THE SEXUAL SCENE 107 (1970).
21. See 36 ALB. L. REV. 428, 436 (1972); Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 1, at 191.
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inmate's right to personal security. For example, in Coffin v.
Reichard,22 a case involving assaults on a prisoner by inmates and
guards, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit enunciated the cur-
rently acknowledged test against which prisoners' rights are measured:
A prisoner retains all rights of an ordinary citizen except those ex-
pressly or by necessary implication taken from him by law. While the
law does take his liberty and imposes a duty of servitude and obser-
vance of discipline for his regulation and that of other prisoners, it
does not deny his right to personal security against unlawful inva-
sion.23
While the court did not specifically delineate the boundaries of its no-
tion of personal security, the implication is clear that such a right may
include freedom from sexual attack.24
Moreover, affirmation of this right additionally may impose a cor-
responding state obligation. In the recent case of Gates v. Collier,25 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed an injunction against an
array of unconstitutional conditions and practices in the maintenance
and operation of the Mississippi State Penitentiary, including the fail-
ure of prison officials to protect the inmates against physical abuses by
other inmates.26 The court noted that since the prisoners had a civil
right to personal security, a correlative duty was imposed upon the
prison administration to protect the inmates' rights.27
Whether the state's failure to provide that protection offers the
prisoner a constitutional justification for escape has not yet been deter-
22. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
23. Id at 445.
24. Consider the following argument for constitutional protection against homosexual as-
sault:
Realizing that the concept of cruel and unusual punishment has been greatly expanded
and is supposed to evolve with the standards of decency of a maturing society, it seems
inconsistent that forced homosexual relations are permitted to exist. Basic to the dignity
of man is the personal integrity of his body. Conditions which force a man to submit to
undesired sexual conduct are both mentally and physically degrading. Applying the
logic used in Holt [Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (Holt II)] and in
Hamilton [Hamilton v. Schiro, Civil No. 69-2443 (E.D. La., June 26, 1970)], the confine-
ment itself under these shocking conditions may violate a prisoner's eighth amendment
rights.
36 ALB. L. REv. 428, 443 (1972).
25. 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); accord, Bethca v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969);
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D.
Ohio 1971).
26. Among the other unconstitutional conditions the court found were the use of milk of
magnesia as corporal punishment; handcuffing to the cells for long periods; confinement in dark
holes without clothing, bedding, or toilet articles; inadequate food and heat; and toilets that
backed up and deposited human wastes in the cells. 501 F.2d at 1306.
27. Regarding prison officials' liability for monetary damages to inmates assaulted by other
prisoners, seeNote, Inmate Assaults and Section 1983 Damage Claims, 54 Cal.-KENT L. REV. 595
(1978).
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mined.28 Defendants who attempt to justify their escapes on such con-
stitutional grounds face two imposing obstacles: the courts' lingering
reluctance to scrutinize prison operations, and their aversion to decid-
ing constitutional issues.
The United States Supreme Court so far has declined to address
this problem.29 Presently, prisoners are more likely to defend their
escapes successfully with common law defenses such as duress and
necessity, rather than constitutional arguments, particularly where ho-
mosexual assaults which prompt the escape occur merely as isolated
incidents and thus are less likely to be considered to reach the level of
cruel and unusual punishment.
DURESS AND NECESSITY
Confusion and misunderstanding have surrounded the common
law defenses of necessity and duress. The courts and state legislatures
have been inconsistent in their enunciation and application of these
defenses. Numerous states have duress statutes, 30 while only a few
states provide a distinct codification of the necessity defense. 3'
28. One argument supporting such a justification is that since escape is generally defined as
voluntary departure from lawful custody, 3 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §
1367 (R. Anderson ed. 1957), escape from unlawful custody is justified. Most cases reflecting this
argument concern technical illegalities, however, and not prison conditions. E.g., People v. Clark,
69 Cal. App. 520, 231 P. 590 (1924) (sheriff imprisoned defendant after sentence suspended); Mel-
ton v. Culver, 107 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1958) (information failed to charge defendant pursuant to
statutory requirements); People v. Wheeler, 39 Mich. App. 607, 197 N.W.2d 831 (1972) (defendant
kept in prison over ten months after sentence should have ended). In People v. Clark, the court
commented, "[Wihen the imprisonment is unlawful, and is itself a crime, the reason which makes
flight from prison an offense does not exist. In such a case, the right to liberty is absolute, and he
who regains it is not guilty of the technical offense of escape..." 69 Cal. App. at 522, 231 P. at
591 (citation omitted). Cf. State v. Rentschler, 444 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. 1969) (judgment vacated);
State v. Hayes, 52 N.J. Super. 178, 145 A.2d 28 (1958) (violation of statute requiring segregation of
juvenile prisoners from adults). Contra, Mullican v. United States, 252 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1958)
(expired sentence); Bayless v. United States, 141 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
748 (1944) (conviction voided); State v. Pace, 402 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. 1966) (original charge dis-
missed); People v. Hill, 17 11. 2d 112, 160 N.E.2d 779 (1959) (invalid indictment); People ex rel.
Haines v. Hunt, 229 App. Div. 419, 242 N.Y.S. 105 (1930) (unconstitutional statute).
29. Perhaps, given Chief Justice Burger's expressed interest in penal affairs, the Court will
soon examine these constitutional issues. See Thoughts on Reform: The Corrections Addresses
of the Chief Justice of the United States--1970-1975 (A.B.A. Commission on Correctional Facili-
ties and Services, Sept. 1975).
30. Eg., HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-5 (1968) provides:
No person shall be held criminally responsible for any act, to the doing of which he is
compelled by force which he cannot resist, or from which he cannot escape;. . . and no
one shall be able to justify himself against a charge of his doing an injury to another, by
showing the threat or imminent danger of an equal or less injury to himself.
For a thorough analysis of applicable state statutes, see Note, .4 Reexamination of Justifiable
Escape, 2 NEW ENG. J. PRISON LAW 205, 252-54 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Reexamination].
31. Eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-11 (1973) provides:
A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense punishable with death, by
reason of conduct which he performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the
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The defense of duress generally excuses one from criminal punish-
ment for performing unlawful conduct if he was coerced to do so by the
use of, or threat to use, unlawful force against himself or another,
which a person of reasonable firmness would have been unable to re-
sist.32 Necessity, in contrast, provides a defense for otherwise unlawful
conduct if the actor reasonably believed the conduct necessary to avoid
a greater harm to himself or another.33
The two defenses have three significant features in common.
First, neither defense is applicable to murder;34 thus, both are distin-
guishable from self-defense.35 Second, the actor must not have been at
fault in creating the situation from which the threat arises.36 Finally,
the threat must be present, imminent, and impending; a threat of future
harm is insufficient.37
Two important factors distinguish the two defenses. The first is
that duress traditionally involves another human being who coerces the
actor to perform certain conduct, whereas necessity has been limited
historically to such non-human forces as acts of God and unavoidable
accidents. 38 Because of this requirement, most prison escapees, until
very recently, have grounded their defenses upon duress and have dis-
regarded necessity.
39
imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he reasonably believes death or
great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him if he does not perform such conduct.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (1973) provides:
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if the
accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and reasonably
believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the
injury which might reasonably result from his own conduct.
Accord, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960), § 3.02 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
See also Reexamination, supra note 30.
32. See generally J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 415-48 (2d ed. 1960)
[hereinafter cited as HALL]; R. PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 951-55 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as PERKINS]; J. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART ch. 18 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WILLIAMS].
33. See generally HALL, supra note 32; PERKINS, supra note 32, at 956-61; WILLIAMS, supra
note 32, at ch. 17.
34. The defense is sometimes defined as excluding capital offenses, which may include other
crimes such as rape. This definition could cause confusion in some states because of the abolish-
ment and re-instatement of the death penalty.
35. Self-defense excuses the killing of the threatener. In contrast, duress and necessity would
involve the killing of an innocent third person. Public policy forbids such killing, even to save
one's own life. See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley, [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273, in which the victims of a ship-
wreck were found guilty of killing a passenger in their lifeboat for food though all passengers
would otherwise have died before rescue.
36. See PERKINS, supra note 32, at 951-61.
37. Id
38. The leading cases which limit the necessity defense are United States v. Holmes, 26 F.
Cas. 306 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383), and Regina v. Dudley, [1884], 14 Q.B.D. 273. See
generally Hersey & Avins, Compulsion as a Defense to Criminal Prosecution, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 283
(1958).
39. See, e.g., People v. Luther, 53 Mich. App. 648, 219 N.W.2d 812 (1974), aft'd, 394 Mich.
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The second, and more significant, distinction between duress and
necessity emerges from the basic nature of each defense. Duress is
founded upon the theory that some compulsion excuses the actor from
blame in a particular case, although the actor admits the wrongfulness
of his act. In effect, the actor is excused, but the act itself is not con-
doned. Indeed, the coercer is criminally responsible for that act.
Necessity, however, involves no actual coercion; there is merely a
choice between two evils, one of which is the commission of the unlaw-
ful act. Because society prefers to avoid the greater evil, public policy
sanctions the choice of the lesser of the two evils.' In such a case, the
actor is still responsible for the deed, but because of special circum-
stances society holds that the act is not wrongful, morally or legally.
The act is not merely excused, it is justified.
Thus, a successful duress defense proves a lack of criminal intent,
but a necessity defense establishes that there was no criminal act.
While a judicial decision regarding duress focuses on the state of mind
of a particular defendant and thus establishes no general rule, a recog-
nition of the necessity defense creates a new rule of law, because the
issue is the act itself.4 Necessity, in contrast to duress, acknowledges a
right to escape.
EARLY CASES: DEFENSE REJECTION
The courts' traditional view that conditions of imprisonment do
not provide justifiable grounds for escape is illustrated by People v.
Whople,42 a 1929 case in which the defendant argued that his flight
from prison camp was necessitated by the unsanitary conditions of the
camp and the brutal, inhumane treatment by prison officers. The Cali-
fornia appellate court, citing previous authorities,43 refused to alter the
settled policy of prohibiting escape defenses:
It is manifest that to allow a prisoner to decide whether the condi-
tions justify him in attempting to escape would be destructive of the
necessary discipline which must be maintained in any well ordered
prison. . . . It is, unfortunately, possible for the conditions of impris-
onment to be so unwholesome as to seriously imperil the health and
619, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975); People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974), a]1'd,
394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975); State v. Pearson, 15 Utah 2d 353, 393 P.2d 390 (1964).
40. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 382 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
LAFAVE & SCOTT].
41. Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape From Prison-4 Step Towards
Incarceration Free From Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 110 (1975).
42. 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929).
43. Johnson v. State, 122 Ga. 172, 50 S.E. 65 (1905); Hinkle v. Commonwealth, 23 Ky. L.
Rpt. 1988, 66 S.W. 816 (1902) (fear of violence from third persons); State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439, 33
Am. Rep. 563 (1880) (unsanitary conditions of jail).
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life of the prisoner by exposure to infection and disease, and unhap-
pily it is possible for prison guards to subject prisoners to abuses and
serious physical injury unjustified by any disciplinary need. How-
ever, a prisoner who escapes for any such reason does so at his
peril.44
This attitude has prevailed in the judiciary until the last few years
and probably remains the majority view. While the courts have found
extremely unsanitary and inhumane prison conditions to be cruel and
unusual punishment warranting injunctive relief,45 they have not rec-
ognized identical conditions as an excuse for self-help.4 6 Nor have they
usually found sufficient justification for escape in the brutality or
threats by guards47 or by other prisoners
s.4
While hoipple has come to stand for the rule that intolerable
prison conditions do not justify escape, the case actually was decided
on the narrow grounds that no statutory defense of necessity existed in
California 9. 4  The court interpreted the California Penal Code, which
limits criminal offenses to those prescribed by statute,50 as precluding
the availability of uncodified common law defenses. Thus, the court
could not recognize a common law necessity defense.5
Nevertheless, the dicta in Whipple may be regarded as a cautious
intimation that necessity might justify prison escape if conditions were
so egregious as to outweigh the need for prison discipline. The court
stated that "ordinary adverse circumstances will not present such a con-
dition as will support a legal excuse for affecting an escape."52 This and
other qualifying statements in the opinion imply the possibility of ex-
ceptions to the rule. From the dicta emerges an expression of the court's
dissatisfaction with the rule and its uneasiness concerning the conflict
between the prisoner's plight and the need to maintain prison discipline
44. 100 Cal. App. at 265, 279 P. at 1010.
45. See text accompanying notes 11-29 supra.
46. Eg., State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 72 A.2d 442 (1950) (extremely bad food, inadequate
medical treatment, inadequate recreation); State v. Cahill, 196 Iowa 486, 194 N.W. 191 (1923)
(bugs, vermin, no furniture, toilet flushed over, inadequate bread and water); State v. Davis, 14
Nev. 439, 33 Am. Rep. 563 (1880) (vermin, filth).
47. E.g., People v. Miller, 196 Cal. App. 2d 171, 16 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1961); Johnson v. State,
122 Ga. 172, 50 S.E. 65 (1905); People v. Rodriguez, 30 111. App. 3d 118, 331 N.E.2d 162 (1975);
Matthews v. State, 288 So. 2d 712 (Miss. 1974); State v. Hayes, 52 N.J. Super. 178, 145 A.2d 28
(1958).
48. People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969); People v. Noble, 18
Mich. App. 300, 170 N.W.2d 916 (1969); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971); State v.
Rentschler, 444 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. 1969); Grubb v. State, 533 P.2d 988 (Okla. 1975).
49. California did have, and presently has, a broad duress statute which was not considered
by the Whipple court. See note 59 infra.
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 6 (West 1972).
51. One commentator suggests that such an interpretation of California law is unsupported
by authority. See 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 466, 471 (1976).
52. 100 Cal. App. at 263, 279 P. at 1009 (emphasis added).
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and order. Nevertheless, the court felt compelled to sustain the tradi-
tional attitude of "hands off" prison matters. Thus, it submissively
disclaimed its own authority and left the matter to the legislature. 3
Forty years after Whipple another California appellate court re-
jected the applicability of both necessity and duress to prison escape.
People v. Richards54 demonstrates that as recently as 1969 the tradi-
tional attitude towards prisoners continued to dominate judicial
thought. Courts remained reluctant to scrutinize prisoner complaints
and when forced to confront such problems consistently applied to
prisoners a unique standard which denied them fundamental legal
rights given to other criminal defendants.
Richards concerned a prisoner upon whom acts of sodomy had
been committed. In spite of the potential dangers of "snitching" 5 the
defendant informed the guards of the assault. No action was taken by
prison officials. Following the other prisoners' subsequent discovery of
the defendant's actions, the defendant was informed that he was
"marked to be killed."'5 6 Having exhausted all possibilities of receiving
help from prison authorities, Richards felt his only remaining alterna-
tive was to escape, and he did so. In affirming the defendant's convic-
tion for escape, the court suggested that the defendant had indeed had
another alternative-submission to sodomy. 7
Citing Whpple extensively, the court summarily rejected the ne-
cessity argument because no such statutory defense existed in Califor-
nia. Nevertheless, in dicta, the court applied a rudimentary balancing
test comparable to that of the necessity defense: whether the evil sought
to be avoided is greater than the evil of the offense committed. The
distressing conclusion was that sodomy was a less serious offense than
escape from prison to avoid such humiliation.58
While the availability of the duress defense under California law
53. The court stated:
[Ilt is with very great reluctance that we admit that, under practically all of the authori-
ties, the foregoing opinion states the established law. . . . The function of the court is to
declare the law as it is, and we are not authorized to usurp the place of the legislature,
which has the power to make laws, and the duty to make just laws.
100 Cal. App. at 265-66, 279 P. at 1010.
54. 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969).
55. An informer, or "snitch," has broken the most inviolate of "prison code" command-
ments, and is almost assured of reprisals by other inmates, regardless of the circumstances or
reasons for his actions.
56. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 771, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
57. Id at 775, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
58. The court stated, "The evil sought to be prevented is not only the escape of the prisoner
in question, but also,. .. the destruction of the general discipline of the prison." 269 Cal. App. 2d
at 778, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
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was acknowledged, 59 the court effectively precluded any practical ap-
plicability of the defense to escape by maintaining the common law
rule that the menacing force must compel the actor to commit the al-
leged criminal act, that is, the escape. This, of course, is never the
situation where the escapee actually is being forced to submit to homo-
sexual acts. Such an interpretation by the Richards court was not re-
quired by the California statute, which merely excuses the offense if the
defendant has reasonable cause to, and does, believe his life will be in
danger if he refuses to commit the offense.60 Evidently, the court was
attempting to restrict the use of the duress defense in order to discour-
age future prison escapes.6'
The duress defense was also rejected upon grounds of the defend-
ant's failure to establish a key element of the defense: that the threat to
the defendant was present and imminent.62 This requirement has been
used repeatedly to defuse contentions of duress. Rarely are the assail-
ants actually in pursuit of the defendant when he escapes. The unique
circumstances of prisons, however, suggest that such pursuit is unneces-
sary to create in the defendant a reasonable fear of imminent harm.
The inability of the defendant to avoid his pursuers, the suddenness of
attacks in prison, and the impossibility of acquiring protection from the
guards may create a lasting and realistic fear which will persist far be-
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(8) (West 1972) provided:
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following
classes:
Eight-Persons (unless the crime be punishable with death) who committed the act or
made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had
reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused.
60. Id
61. This requirement has been criticized as being inconsistent with other basic policies of the
duress defense. A New Use, supra note 4, at 1079-80. The author argues that the Richards court's
reasoning breaks down where the defendant is faced with a threat of death and thus given no
alternative to escape. The author contends that in such a case the better view is that the defend-
ant, although not "absolutely driven" to escape, is in effect compelled by circumstances to do so,
and, thus, should be excused from punishment for exercising the valid option of escape to avoid
death.
The Richards court is correct, however, in suggesting that the defendant in such a situation is
in fact confronted with numerous alternatives, however abhorrent some of them may be. He may
submit to his assailants; he may resist; he may continue to pursue legal remedies; he may escape.
The defendant is not in fact compelled to escape. For this reason the defense of necessity, which
weighs the relative harm of those alternatives and judges whether the defendant made the least
harmful choice, is more appropriate to these circumstances. The Richards court's analysis of the
duress defense is technically correct. It is the court's judgment that escape is a greater evil than
submission or resistance to sodomous attacks which bears criticism.
62. The court quoted People v. Sanders, 82 Cal. App. 778, 785, 256 P. 251, 254 (1927): "The
danger must not be one of future violence, but of present and immediate violence at the time of
the commission of the forbidden act. The danger of death at some future time in the absence of
danger of death at the time of the commission of the offense will not excuse." 269 Cal. App. 2d at
774, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
yond the moment of actual threat.63 Such conditions suggest a standard
of reasonableness concerning the defendant's fear of injury: if the de-
fendant had reasonable cause to believe that he was in imminent dan-
ger, the requirement should be satisfied. The Richards court, however,
maintained the traditional notion of "gun to the head immediacy."'
Surely the question of whether the compelling threat was present
and imminent is one of fact, and should be resolved by the jury. The
Richards court, however, forbade the defendant from offering his de-
fense to the jury. Consequently, there being no evidence upon which
to raise a question of fact, the defendant's reasons for escape were
deemed immaterial.65
Two years after Richards, the Missouri Supreme Court advanced
conventional notions regarding judicial interference in prison affairs in
the case of State v. Green.6 6 While Green maintained the prevailing
judicial doctrine of prohibiting prison escape defenses, a strong dissent
by Judge Seiler indicated an emerging judicial awareness that a person
does not forfeit his humanity when he enters prison.67
In Green, the defendant, a white, nineteen-year-old, one-hundred-
fifty-pound first offender, was incarcerated with older, second offenders
and "lifers" in a residential building where inmates were free to
wander during the day and enter any cell at night by easily picking the
cell door locks or using a secretly obtained key. Because there were
few guards, areas of the building were periodically unsupervised for
substantial periods of time. Shortly after the defendant was incarcer-
ated, he was attacked during the night in his cell by two inmates who
forced him at knifepoint to submit to acts of sodomy. Immediately
thereafter, he feigned suicide in order to contact the prison administra-
tion.68 He requested the protection of prison officials, but was told to
63. See4 New Use, supra note 4, at 1075.
64. People v. Unger, 33 Ill. App. 3d 770, 775, 338 N.E. 2d 442, 446 (1975).
65. The court approved the trial court's instruction to the jury that "[tihe reasons, if any,
given for the alleged escape are immaterial and not to be considered by you as in any way justify-
ing or excusing, if there was such." 269 Cal. App. 2d at 772, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 600-01.
66. 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972).
67. Id. at 568-71 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
68. An inmate could transmit a written complaint to prison officials through the use of a
"snitch-kite," an intra-prison mail system. However such a procedure required several days for
transmission and response. An inmate could complain directly to a guard, but not without the
likelihood that the other inmates would soon know that the victim had "snitched," in which case,
according to the defendant, the snitch "was as good as dead right then." In any case, the prison
administration would not investigate a complaint unless the assailant was identified. Further-
more, unless a guard actually witnessed the assault, the alleged assailant would be allowed to
remain among the general prison population during the investigation. The victim's only possible
protection was confinement in the "hole," the prison's disciplinary facility. 470 S.W.2d at 569.
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"go back and fight it out."6 9 Two weeks later, Green was again
homosexually raped in his cell by three inmates. He again feigned
suicide, reported the incident to prison authorities, and asked for pro-
tection. The disciplinary board told the defendant to "fight it out, sub-
mit to the assaults, or go over the fence."70
Three months later, four or five inmates entered the defendant's
cell and informed him that they would return that night and make him
a "punk,"'" or they would kill him. Convinced that informing prison
authorities would be useless, Green escaped that evening to avoid the
assault. He was apprehended the next morning a few miles away.
The defendant argued that his escape was justified because it was
the only possible means of protecting himself. He claimed that the ex-
isting intolerable conditions, combined with the state's denial to the
defendant of access to the courts for redress of those unconstitutional
conditions, made his escape necessary.72
The majority rejected the defendant's argument because: (1) there
was no evidence of denial of access to the courts; and (2) the threat to
the defendant was not present and impending. The first finding was
based on the conclusion that the defendant had not specifically re-
quested access to the courts.73 The second conclusion was the inevitable
result of the court's adherence to customary notions of immediacy and
disregard for the unique circumstances of correctional institutions.74
Both conclusions were patently unreasonable. The evidence plainly
raised issues of fact as to the exhaustion of legal remedies and the im-
minence of the threat to the defendant. The court was unjustified in
resolving these questions as matters of law.
Judge Seiler, in his well-reasoned dissent, was concerned with the
"horrific dilemma"75 in which the defendant, through no fault of his
69. Id at 566.
70. Id
71. A punk plays the female role in homosexual acts. Id at 570.
72. The defendant's claim that he had been denied access to the courts was based on the
unavailability to the inmates of lawyers to prepare pleadings and render legal advice. 470 S.W.2d
at 567.
73. Whether the defendant could have reached the courts had he attempted to do so was
considered irrelevant:
There can be no denial unless there exists in the defendant a desire and a seeking of
access to the courts. The mere fact that legal assistance was not directly or immediately
available to inmates in general and, therefore, would not have been available to him f
he had sought access to the courts does not afford him substantial ground upon which to
base a claim of denial of access where there is no showing that he, in fact, desired access
to the courts.
470 S.W.2d at 567.
74. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
75. 470 S.W.2d at 571 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
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own, found himself. The effect of the court's decision, Judge Seiler
reasoned, was to relegate the defendant to the alternatives of either de-
basing himself as a "punk," or risking his life as a "snitch." The impo-
sition of such a distasteful choice upon a defendant who was compelled
to escape was unjust. Judge Seiler argued that the defenses of coercion
and necessity were based upon the "fundamental principle that crimi-
nal punishment should not be visited upon the blameless."76 Therefore,
if the defendant could establish that indeed he had been compelled to
escape, he would be without blame and entitled to acquittal. The facts
in Green surely were sufficient to raise a question as to whether the
defendant was without fault, and "when the facts presented, if believed,
would establish the defense of coercion, then this defense should be
available to a charge of escape." 77
Judge Seiler's argument that "the act of escape was just as much
coerced as the prior act of sodomy"78 perhaps makes sense on an emo-
tional level, but stretches conventional notions of duress. However
true it was that a reasonable man would have been unable to resist the
assailants' threats, the inevitable result was not escape but submission.
Judge Seiler himself pointed out that the defendant's unwillingness to
submit was not unreasonable, and "all that was left was escape."79 He
seems to suggest that the defendant made the most reasonable choice
under the circumstances-to escape. Therefore, his argument suggests
application of the defense of necessity, which justifies a free choice of
the least evil alternative.
Contrary to the majority's reliance on precedent, Judge Seiler's
persuasive dissent recognized that the exclusion of the coercion and ne-
cessity defenses to prisoners was an unjust, anachronistic practice
which contradicted established common law principles. His emphasis
on the facts demonstrated that there are extreme situations where a le-
gitimate question of fact is raised and should not be prevented by an
inequitable ruling of law from reaching the jury. Judge Seiler astutely
recognized the injustice of denying prison escapees the opportunity to
defend themselves. His dissent in Green foreshadowed an approach-
ing reversal of the judiciary's position regarding the availability of de-
fenses to charges of prison escape.
76. Id at 570.




RECENT CASES: DEFENSE RECOGNITION-DURESS
As public and judicial awareness of prisoners' rights expanded in
the late 1960's and early 1970's, the arguments propounded by Judge
Seiler in Green found increasing recognition and support. But the no-
tion that a convict might be justified in escaping from "intolerable"
prison conditions, while becoming more palatable, continued to be re-
jected by the courts. The pendulum finally swung to the other side in
1974 when two Michigan courts of appeals concurrently held that the
duress defense was available to prison escapees.
In People v. Luther,8" the defendant testified that he was accosted
in a prison lavatory by six assailants who made homosexual demands
of him. When he refused to acquiesce he was beaten with a toilet bowl
brush, threatened with a knife, and "literally chased off the grounds."' '
During his flight he attempted unsuccessfully to locate the guard on
duty. Luther was found the next morning a few miles from the camp.
The court of appeals' reversal of the defendant's conviction for es-
cape was founded on very narrow grounds which appear to minimize
the case's significance. The court held that the trial judge had commit-
ted reversible error by offering an obviously confusing and prejudicial
jury instruction: "I instruct you that it is not a defense to escaping
prison that the defendant fled to avoid homosexual attacks by other
prisoners. However, you may consider as a valid defense whether the
defendant escaped while being under duress." 2 It is significant, how-
ever, that the court indicated that the first sentence, and not the second,
was the incorrect instruction. Whereas flight from homosexual attacks
had never been recognized as a defense to escape, nor had any argu-
ment of duress, suddenly an appellate court, almost matter-of-factly,
indicated that the reverse was true, that fear of homosexual assault
could indeed justify prison escape.
The Michigan Supreme Court eliminated any possible narrow
construction of this holding when it affirmed the appellate decision. 3
In broad language the court established a unique test whereby, in order
to raise the duress defense, a defendant would have to present evidence
from which a jury might conclude that:
A) The threatening conduct was sufficient to create in the mind of a
reasonable person the fear of death or serious bodily harm;
80. 53 Mich. App. 648, 219 N.W.2d 812 (1974), aff'd, 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975).
The other case was People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974), aff'd, 394
Mich. 625, 232 N.w.2d 187 (1975). See text accompanying notes 89-101 infra.
81. 394 Mich. 619, 621, 232 N.W.2d 184, 186 (1975).
82. 53 Mich. App. at 651, 219 N.w.2d at 814.
83. 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975).
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B) • The conduct in fact caused such fear of death or serious bodily
harm in the mind of the defendant;
C) The fear or duress was operating upon the mind of the defond-
ant at the time of the alleged act; and
D) The defendant committed the act to avoid the threatened
harm.84
At the same time that the Luther court embraced the duress de-
fense it significantly altered the historical duress concept. The Luther
test made no mention of the requirement that the threatening force ac-
tually compel the actor to commit the alleged offense-the escape. Fur-
thermore, the test eliminated the criterion of a present and impending
danger.8 5 The court distinctly indicated that extreme circumstances
might induce sufficient fear to overcome an inmate's "free will,"
thereby removing the requisite criminal intent necessary to commit the
crime of escape.86
Two problems for defendants arise from the Luther test. The first
problem is that the test severely limits the potential success of the du-
ress defense by requiring not merely that the threat be sufficient to cre-
ate the fear of death or serious bodily harm in a reasonable person, but
that the threat did in fact create such apprehension in the defendant,
sufficient to remove his free will and compel him to escape. State of
mind is very difficult to prove, and in a prison escape trial, proof un-
doubtedly would rest entirely upon the uncorroborated testimony of
the defendant himself."7 Considering that the judiciary desires to limit
the escape defense as much as possible, and that Luther was the first
case to allow any such defense, the imposition of such a limitation is
understandable.
The second problem for escapees is that the Luther holding merely
excused the defendant in that particular case because the evidence, if
proven, would have established that the defendant had acted without
free will. The court did not condone prison escape; it did not recog-
nize, as would a necessity defense, that the defendant acted freely, con-
sciously, and justifiably. Therefore, the Luther decision did not hold
that any defendant under similar circumstances would be justified in
making the same choice of escape.88 This ruling imposes a severe limi-
84. Id. at 623, 232 N.W.2d at 187.
85. In the Luther case, a requirement of a present and impending threat certainly would
have been met if the veracity of the defendant's testimony were established. That testimony indi-
cated that the defendant was actually being pursued by his assailants at the time he left the prison
camp. 394 Mich. at 620-21, 232 N.W.2d at 186.
86. Id at 622, 232 N.W.2d at 187.
87. Other prisoners who might be able to support the defendant's story would naturally be
reluctant to testify out of their own fear of reprisal by other inmates.
88. See text accompanying note 41 supra, on the distinction between duress and necessity.
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tation upon the potential success of escape defenses. At the same time,
Luther must be considered a breakthrough in the development of pris-
oners' rights.
In People v. Harmon,9 another Michigan court of appeals almost
simultaneously with the Luther court allowed the duress defense in a
case of prison escape. However, the Harmon court probed deeper into
the political justifications for and ramifications of acceptance of the du-
ress defense.
The defendant in Harmon was an eighteen-year-old male who re-
cently had been transferred from regular prison facilities to a commu-
nal dormitory system. His previously expressed apprehensions about
the " 'things' he heard went on out there"' were soon realized. Within
a few days of his transfer, he was severely beaten for refusing to coop-
erate with a group of seven or eight inmates who had demanded sex
from him. The defendant did not report the incident out of fear of
reprisal from his attacker and other inmates.9' A few days later the
defendant was again approached and beaten, and warned that he
would be attacked until he submitted. The next night he escaped.
The court held that the facts, which were corroborated by two wit-
nesses, were "more than sufficient to require the submission of the de-
fense of duress to the jury in the appropriate manner."'92 To establish
the defense, the defendant had to show that his conduct was "necessi-
tated by threatening conduct of another which resulted in defendant
harboring a reasonable fear of imminent or immediate death or serious
bodily harm.
93
Noticeably absent again from this definition of duress is the re-
quirement that the assailants demand that the defendant escape. Un-
doubtedly, the court was aware that retaining that criterion would
inevitably prohibit application of the defense. The requirement that
the threat be present and imminent was retained. However, the court's
statement that the issue of immediacy must be determined by the jury
taking into consideration all the surrounding circumstances, including
the defendant's opportunity and ability to avoid the injury, suggests an
expansive interpretation of that rule.94
89. 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974), aff'd, 394 Mich- 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975).
90. 53 Mich- App. at 484-85, 220 N.W.2d at 214.
91. See note 55 umpra.
92. 53 Mich. App. at 486, 220 N.W.2d at 214.
93. Id
94. The Michigan Supreme Court remarked in its affirmance that the fact that the defendant
did not escape until twenty-four hours after the confrontation "[did] not suffice to remove the
defense of duress from the consideration of the jury." 394 Mich. at 626, 232 N.W.2d at 188.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The court's examination of policy issues evidenced an awareness
of the increasing legitimization of prisoners' rights and the parallel
emergence of corresponding obligations of the state. Acknowledging
the growing problem of homosexual rapes in our prisons, the court af-
firmed that legislative penal reform was the best solution to this prob-
lem, but that fact should not prohibit defendants from presenting
"established defenses"95 in the courts.
The Harmon court declined to follow an earlier Michigan case,
People Y. Noble," which had feared that allowing the defense would
generate a "rash of escapes, all rationalized by unverifiable tales of sex-
ual assault."97 The Harmon court's response pointed out that a mere
allegation of duress would not suffice to prevent a conviction: the de-
fendant still must prove his case according to established trial proce-
dures.98 Furthermore, allowing the duress defense might in fact reduce
the number of escapes, because recognition of legitimate complaints
might spur penal reform, thereby removing the impetus for flight. 99
Other courts appear to consider Harmon more persuasive than
Luther.1°° One reason, perhaps, is that Harmon initially was decided
on less technical grounds than Luther. Assuredly, the acceptance of
Harmon also is due to that court's enlightened commentary on the in-
terrelation of our penal and judicial systems, an example of which may
be seen where the court stated:
The time has come when we can no longer close our eyes to the
growing problem of institutional gang rapes in our prison system..
. . Indeed, the State has a duty to assure inmate safety .... The
persons in charge of our prisons and jails are obliged to take reason-
able precautions in order to provide a place of confinement where a
prisoner is safe from gang rapes and beatings by fellow inmates, safe
from guard ignorance of pleas for help and safe from intentional
placement into situations where an assault of one type or another is
95. 53 Mich- App. at 488, 220 N.W.2d at 215.
96. 18 Mich. App. 300, 170 N.W.2d 916 (1969).
97. Id at 303, 170 N.W.2d at 918.
98. The court stated, "[tihe defense... must be established by competent evidence in a trial
where the testimony of witnesses is subjected to the scrutiny of the fact-finder who, in the course of
determining the true facts of the case, would properly consider the credibility of the various wit-
nesses." 53 Mich- App. at 487, 220 N.W.2d at 215.
99. The court stated:
If the conditions of our penal institutions have reached the point where the only recourse
to free one's self from unwanted personnel attacks is to flee, then any improvements
made in our prisons with respect to assuring the personal safety of the inmates could
only serve to eliminate from the ranks of escapees those who do so solely in an effort to
protect themselves. The result, therefore, might well be fewer prison escapes rather than
more.
Id at 487-88, 220 N.W.2d at 215.
100. Eg., People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974); People v.
Unger, 66 IlL 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977).
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likely to result. If our prison system fails to live up to its responsibil-
ities in this regard we should not, indirectly, countenance such a fail-
ure by precluding the presentation of a defense based on thosefacts. v
The significance of the Luther and Harmon cases is twofold. In
essence, they represent judicial action and reaction. Because they were
the first cases to allow a defense to an inmate's flight from homosexual
assault, they must be acknowledged as the spearhead of a new judicial
movement to recognize the potential legitimacy of defenses to prison
escape. But these opinions were not issued in a vacuum, nor was the
timing purely coincidental. Rather, these cases reflect the emerging
awareness, both judicial and societal, that prisoners retain certain rights
in spite of their incarceration, and that they are just as entitled as soci-
ety at large to have those rights protected by judicial scrutiny.
RECENT CASES: DEFENSE RECOGNITION-NECESSITY
Since the Luther and Harmon cases, there has been a marked shift
in emphasis away from the duress defense and towards the necessity
defense. Recent decisions indicate that the judiciary regards necessity
as a more appropriate defense to charges of prison escape. ' 0 2 Necessity
justifies conduct predicated upon a reasonable belief that such action
was required to avoid a greater evil. It is premised upon a conscious
choice of action, as opposed to compulsion by an irresistable force.
While it remains debatable whether a decision to escape in order to
avoid homosexual attack is indeed an act of free will, many courts to-
day apparently regard the prison escapee's act as one of choice, not
compulsion.
In People v. Lovercamp,t°3 the California Court of Appeal for the
Fourth District became the first court to allow the application of neces-
sity to prison escape from homosexual molestation. This opinion,
handed down only a few months after the appellate court decisions in
Luther and Harmon, quickly was recognized as a landmark. 1o" None-
theless, Lovercamp is revolutionary not merely due to its holding but
101. 53 Mich. App. at 483-84, 220 N.W.2d at 213.
102. Some defendants, of course, continue to submit pleas of duress. Eg., Stewart v.
United States, 370 A.2d 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Hill v. State, 135 Ga. App. 766, 219 S.E.2d 18
(1975). In both of these cases, the defense failed because of an insufficient factual basis.
103. 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974).
104. Almost all subsequent decisions in prison escape cases have cited Lovercamp. Most of
these courts have found the Lovercamp opinion highly persuasive. See, e.g., State v. Boleyn, 328
So. 2d 95 (La. 1976); People v. Hocquard, 64 Mich. App. 331, 236 N.W.2d 72 (1975); State v.
Worley, 265 S.C. 551, 220 S.E.2d 242 (1975).
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because the court utilized a balancing test under which the interests of
the escapee could, and did, outweigh those of society.
The defendants in Lovercamp were two women, one of whom was
mentally retarded, who had been continuously threatened by a group
of lesbian inmates with the frightening ultimatum to "fuck or fight."° 5
The defendants complained to the authorities several times, with no
results. On the day of the escape, the defendants were approached and
attacked by ten or fifteen assailants who warned they would soon re-
turn. The defendants, in fear for their lives, escaped, and were
promptly captured.
In contrast to the Whipple and Richards courts, the Lovercamp
court acknowledged the necessity defense, despite the lack of statutory
authority. 0 6  In permitting the defense of necessity to be submitted to
the jury, the Lovercamp court manifested a modern, enlightened ap-
proach towards the problems associated with our penal institutions.'°
Emphasis was shifted away from the sanctity of prison discipline to-
wards a concern for the physical safety and legal protection of the pris-
oner. The few courts which previously had considered a balancing of
interests all had held summarily that societal interests predominate.
0 8
The Lovercamp court rejected that strict rule.
105. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 118 Cal. Rptr. at I11.
106. For a consideration of whether Lovercamp is repugnant to or inconsistent with Califor-
nia statutory law, see 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 466 (1976).
107. The court's remarkably incisive observations deserve extensive reproduction:
When our culture abandoned such unjpleasantries as torture, dismemberment,
maiming and flogging as punishment for anti-social behavior and substituted in their
place loss of liberty, certain problems immediately presented themselves. As a "civilized"
people, we demanded that incarceration be under reasonably safe and humane condi-
tions. On the other hand, we recognized that the institutional authorities must be af-
forded a certain firmness of program by which the malefactors be kept where sentenced
for the allotted period of time . . . . [A]s an aid to discourage self-help release from
incarceration, the offense of escape was born.
However, rather early in the legal history of the offense of escape, it became clear
that all departures from lawful custody were not necessarily escapes or, to put it more
accurately, there was a possible defense to an escape charge, to wit, necessity. . . . [W]e
may assume that a prisoner with his back to the wall, facing a gang of fellow-inmates
approaching him with drawn knives, who are making it very clear that they intend to kill
him, might be expected to go over the wall rather than remain and be a martyr to the
principle of prison discipline.
However, the doctrine of necessity to "excuseth the felony" carried with it the seeds
of mischief. . . . Inevitably, severe limitations were affixed to this defense and the gen-
eral rule evolved that intolerable living conditions in prison afforded no justification for
escape. A reading of the cases invoking this rule presents a harsh commentary on prison
life in these United States of America, revealing . . . prison life which is harsh, brutal,
filthy, unwholesome and inhumaiie. ...
In a humane society some attention must be given to the individual dilemma. ...
[Bloth the public's interest and the individual's interest may be adequately protected.
43 Cal. App. 3d at 826-27, 118 Cal. Rptr. at I!1-12.
108. The Lovercamp court remarked that past decisions "reflect an attitude of the courts
which might charitably be characterized as viewing [the problem of escape] with alarm but with
results varying from benign neglect to dynamic inertia." Id. at 828, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
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The court observed that traditional concern for societal interests
"tended to focus attention away from the immediate choices available
to the defendant and the propriety of his cause of action."'" But "in a
humane society some attention must be given to the individual di-
lemma.""o The public interest still must be protected, of course, and
the courts must exercise "extreme caution""' to ensure the mainte-
nance of prison order. However, by "determining whether the act of
escape was the only viable and reasonable choice available. . . both
the public's interest and the individual's interest may adequately be
protected."" 2
The court's discussion of "choice" points to a key element of the
Lovercamp decision: the essence of the necessity doctrine is the justifi-
cation of one's choice of conduct. The defendants were not found to
have committed an unlawful act, merely excusable under the particular
coercive circumstances of the case. Rather, they made a free, con-
scious decision to escape, and that decision was upheld as the most
reasonable, least harmful choice. The act of escape, therefore, was not
unlawful. Thus, any defendant under similar circumstances would be
justified in escaping, irrespective of that person's state of mind. The
objective act of escape itself, not the defendants' subjective mental
state, is what was condoned in Lovercamp.
The consequences of that decision are apparent. While the court
hastened to add that the new defense was "extremely limited in its ap-
plication,"" "3 the holding was visibly the broadest recognition of a de-
fense to escape up to that time. In an effort to limit the ramifications of
its decision, the court restricted applicability of the defense to situations
which met five conditions:
1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sex-
ual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future;
2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists
a history of futile complaints which make any result from such com-
plaints illusory,
3) There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts;
4) There is no evidence of force or violence used towards prison
personnel or other "innocent" persons in the escape; and
5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when
he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat."
4
109. Id at 827, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
110. Id Undoubtedly, the fact that the defendants were two women, one of whom was re-
tarded, played a significant role in arousing the court's sympathy for prison inmates.
Ill. Id
112. Id (emphasis added).
113. Id at 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
114. Id at 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
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Analysis of Lovercamp Criteria
The Lovercamp standards preserve some traditional elements of
the necessity defense and create some unique elements as well. The
new elements of the defense are natural outgrowths of the application
of common law necessity to the particular realities of prison institu-
tions. Nevertheless, application of some of these criteria is intrinsically
or potentially unreasonable.
The first Lovercamp condition is that the prisoner must be faced
with an immediate threat of serious harm. Significantly, the California
court specifically added forcible sexual attack to the traditional require-
ment of a threat of death or substantial bodily injury. This inclusion is
a demonstrative acknowledgment of the severity of such an attack by
one inmate upon another." 5 However, the requirement of immediacy,
which preserves the common law notion of "present and impending," is
unrealistic within the context of prison institutions. The escapee rarely
is chased from the confines of the prison; nonetheless, the threatened
harm in the near future is real and inevitable. Instead of immediacy, a
reasonable temporal relationship between the threatened injury and the
escape should be required. Such a precondition would guard against
fraudulent assertions of the defense as much as possible without alto-
gether precluding the defense's availability.
The question of the reasonability of the time factor must be
viewed in conjunction with the second and third conditions established
by the Lovercamp court, that there be no time to resort to administra-
tive or judicial authorities for assistance. Where the threat to the pris-
oner is immediate, these two criteria are, of course, satisfied. If,
however, there is substantial time between the threat and the escape,
then the court must consider whether there was sufficient opportunity
to resort to the authorities or the courts. If so, the escape was unneces-
sary and the defense should be prohibited. On the other hand, if there
was insufficient opportunity to obtain help from the authorities, or if
such an effort would have been futile, then the court should allow the
defense.
These requirements that there be no opportunity to resort to the
authorities maintain the priority of administrative remedies, preserve
115. The court commented:
While we must confess a certain naivete as to just what kind of exotic erotica is involved
in the gang rape of the victim by a group of lesbians and a total ignorance of just who is
forced to do what to whom, we deem it a reasonable assumption that it entails as much
physical and psychological insult to and degradation of a fellow human being as does
orcible sodomy.
Id at 832, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
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prison authorities' jurisdiction over correctional problems, and mini-
mize judicial involvement. Moreover, if the foundation of the inmate's
necessity defense is that he has chosen the least of three
evils-submission to homosexual assaults, physical resistance, and es-
cape-he should be obligated to choose the least harmful alternative of
applying to the authorities for protection where such an alternative is
realistic." 6 At the same time, these conditions recognize that there are
circumstances where recourse to "legal" remedies is impossible. How-
ever, these criteria, like the requirement of an "immediate" threat, will
operate fairly only if they are interpreted broadly, so as not to prevent
reasonable utilization of the defense. 117
The fourth condition, that no force be used by the escapee, is a
misdirected attempt to limit the damage done to public interests. Such
a criterion contradicts basic common law necessity doctrine," 8 which
sanctions the least deleterious alternative, and undermines the founda-
tion of the defense, which is the minimization of societal harm. A more
rational restriction would be that the defendant not implement his es-
cape with unreasonable force. If the defendant were to exert greater
force he no longer would be entitled to legal protection. But a require-
ment of an escape without any force is unjust because it forbids the use
of minimal force to prevent serious physical harm and condemns other-
wise justifiable escapes.
The fifth requirement, that the prisoner surrender to the authori-
ties following his escape, is extremely important, but the court's insis-
tence upon an immediate surrender is unreasonable. A prisoner who
escapes, then turns around and surrenders himself, undoubtedly would
be thrust back into the same environment from which he had escaped.
The escape would be more likely to aggravate than resolve the inmate's
predicament. The defendant should be allowed a reasonable time to
reach a point of safety and secure judicial protection before committing
himself into custody." 9 Nonetheless, if a prisoner is permitted to es-
cape only to avoid a greater evil to himself, he is under a duty to mini-
mize the harm further by reporting to the proper authorities as soon as
is reasonably possible. An unjustified delay should be regarded as a
116. Accord, People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929); State v. Green, 470
S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971); LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 40, at 387.
117. The Lo vercamp court's characterization of the necessity defense as "extremely limited"
suggests future restricted, and consequently often unjust, rejection of the defense in California.
43 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
118. See generally LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 40, at 381-88.
119. Contra, 4 New Use, supra note 4, at 1067. The author argues that immediate surrender
should be required to assure that the defendant acted in good faith and with the intent to avoid
death.
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separate offense of escape. 120
Subsequent Application of Lovercamp in Other States
The Lovercamp conditions clearly were designed by the court to
restrict the necessity plea as much as possible. Yet, the mere allowance
of the defense was a significant step. Whether the prison doors have
been opened remains to be seen, but already there is a visible inclina-
tion in other jurisdictions to follow or extend Lovercamp and allow
some prisoners to offer justifications for their escapes.
In People v. Hocquard,'2 a Michigan appellate court scrutinized
an inmate's escape following the prison authorities' failure to deliver
medical attention to the defendant for a painful back injury. The
court concluded that a "very limited"' 22 defense of necessity was appli-
cable to situations where a prisoner had been denied medical care. 2
3
The court recited the five Lovercamp standards, applied them to the
facts, and concluded that the defendant was not entitled to submit the
necessity defense to the jury because the record did not satisfy the third
condition: that the defendant must have had no time to resort to the
courts for help. Hence, the necessity defense was recognized but disal-
lowed.
Similarly, in State v. Boleyn,' 24 the Supreme Court of Louisiana
announced the availability of the necessity defense, but did not allow
its submission to the jury. In that case the defendant's evidence that he
had been raped the night before the escape was considered an insuffi-
cient foundation for the defense because it merely established the first
of the five defense requirements. The court held that all five
Lovercamp criteria must be met to allow submission of the "extremely
limited"'25 defense to the jury.
In State v. Worley'26 the necessity defense was applied to the de-
nial of adequate medical treatment, but, once again, though the defense
120. Just as the escapee is obligated to surrender at the first reasonable opportunity, the
courts should ensure that, until the defendant's claim is investigated, the defendant will not be
returned to the same prison environment. The state owes the prisoner a duty to protect his per-
sonal security. See text accompanying notes 20-26, supra.
121. 64 Mich. App. 331, 236 N.W.2d 72 (1975).
122. Id at 337, 236 N.W.2d at 75.
123. The court acknowledged the recent precedent set in Michigan by People v. Harmon, 53
Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974), aff'd, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.w.2d 187 (1975), which
accepted the defense of duress. See text accompanying notes 89-101 supra. However, the
Hocquard court concluded that a necessity defense was more appropriate to the facts of the case.
64 Mich. App. at 337, 236 N.W.2d at 75.
124. 328 So. 2d 95 (La. 1976).
125. Id at 97.
126. 265 S.C. 551, 220 S.E.2d 242 (1975).
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was acknowledged it was not permitted in that case to go to the jury.
The defendant had escaped after being denied treatment for a severe
case of poison ivy which had developed into rashes and open, running
sores on the defendant's forearm. He was captured two years later.
The South Carolina Supreme Court established six conditions which
must be satisfied before the necessity defense can be available. 27 These
conditions essentially parallel those of Lovercamp. The defendant
clearly did not satisfy the requirement of immediate surrender. The
defense was obviously fraudulent, its factual foundation weak, yet the
court used the opportunity to announce the availability of the defense.
At the same time, the court reiterated the continuing concern of the
judiciary for public safety and prison efficiency. Strict limitation of the
necessity defense within the stated guidelines was imperative to "[pro-
tect] against assertions by those prisoners who would endanger prison
life and public safety by escaping and fabricate charges of inhuman
treatment or neglect as an afterthought to their flight from justice."'
' 28
Hocquard and Worley indicate a willingness to extend the neces-
sity defense to cases of escape from inadequate medical treatment.
Whether the courts will allow the trend towards greater availability of
the defense to encompass other manifestations of intolerable prison
conditions, such as unsanitary facilities or brutal treatment, is presently
unknown. No recent cases have considered those problems.
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court did not feel compelled to se-
verely limit the necessity defense in order to preserve the interests of
society. The important case of People v. Unger'29 was the first decision
since Lovercamp to allow the necessity plea to reach the jury. 30 Even
more significant, however, was the court's opinion, which discarded
127. The six criteria are:
I) The prisoner must have informed prison officials of the condition, in writing, unless
admitted by the prison officials, and have been denied professional medical care;
2) There must not be time to resort to the courts;
3) The escape must be without use or threat of use of force;
4) The escapee must promptly seek professional medical treatment;
5) The treating physician, or if he is unavailable, a physician responding to a hypothet-
ical question, must testify the prisoner was actually in danger of death or immediate
serious permanent bodily injury unless the prisoner was given prompt professional medi-
cal treatment;
6) After seeing the physician, the prisoner must immediately surrender himself to the
authorities.
Id at 554-55, 220 S.E.2d at 243.
128. Id at 555, 220 S.E.2d at 244.
129. 66 IMI. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977).
130. A few months later the necessity defense again reached the jury in Bavero v. State, 347
So. 2d 781 (Fla. App. 1977). While technically a necessity case, the Bavero decision was actually
concerned with the issue of intent- Whether the defendant had escaped out of necessity was
regarded merely as relevant to the question of whether the defendant had had the requisite willful
intent to avoid lawful confinement.
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much of the restrictive language applied to the defenses by previous
courts, and provided defendants with maximum accessibility of the de-
fense.
The facts of Unger parallel those of Harmon and Lovercamp: ho-
mosexual molestation, threats of future assaults, escape. According to
the defendant's testimony, during the first two months of his imprison-
ment he was homosexually threatened by another inmate brandishing a
six-inch knife. The defendant requested and received a transfer to the
honor farm where, two weeks later, he was beaten and sexually as-
saulted by a gang of prisoners. He did not report this incident because
he was told he would be killed if he did so. Several days later, a pris-
oner called the defendant and threatened to kill him that evening be-
cause the caller had heard that Unger had reported the assault. At that
point, the defendant escaped. He was apprehended two days later in a
motel room thirty miles from the penitentiary, still in prison attire, at-
tempting to contact friends in Canada.
The defendant pleaded both duress and necessity to charges of es-
cape, but the trial court allowed neither defense. The Illinois Appel-
late Court, citing Harmon, and failing, as did the Harmon court, to
distinguish clearly between duress and necessity, reversed the trial
court ruling and remanded to allow the defense to go to the jury.' 3' The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, but spe-
cifically held that necessity was the proper defense to apply under Illi-
nois law to prison escape cases.
132
While the decision may be viewed as a mere strict application of
the Illinois necessity statute, 33 since the alleged facts plainly were en-
compassed by the language of the statute," 4 it is unlikely that the case
would have been resolved the same way only a few years ago. In fact,
previous Illinois appellate courts had rejected the duress argument be-
cause, among other reasons, the defendant had not been compelled by
other inmates to escape. 31 Such a common law interpretation of duress
131. 33 ll. App. 3d 770, 338 N.E.2d 442 (1975).
132. 66 III. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977).
133. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (1973). See note 31, supra.
134. The defendant's attempt to avoid homosexual encounters by requesting a transfer after
he was first assaulted indicates that he was "without blame in occasioning or developing the situa-
tion." The evidence indicated that the defendant understood from the phoned threat that other
inmates planned to kill him. He therefore "reasonably believed" that his escape was "necessary
to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his
own conduct." The defendant, therefore, according to a strict interpretation of the necessity de-
fense, was entitled to have the jury consider his defense.
135. People v. Rodriguez, 30 111. App. 3d 118, 331 N.E. 2d 162 (1975); People v. Terry, 30 IlL.
App. 3d 713, 332 N.E.2d 765 (1975).
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was not required by Illinois law.'36 The Unger court similarly might
have barred the necessity defense by interpreting the necessity statute
according to common law limitations, such as the restriction to non-
human forces. The majority opinion acknowledged that "prison es-
capes induced by fear of homosexual assaults and accompanying physi-
cal reprisals do not conveniently fit within the traditional ambits of
either the compulsion or the necessity defense."'' 37 The court might
have applied this argument as a basis for prohibiting the necessity de-
fense. Instead, it chose to establish a new Illinois policy, in effect ac-
knowledging and enlarging the civil rights of prison inmates.
In Unger the court concluded that duress was decidedly inappro-
priate because traditionally it involves a demand that the defendant
perform the specific criminal act for which he is later charged, 38 and
certainly no prisoners had threatened Unger with harm if he would not
escape. Rather, the defendant had voluntarily decided to escape in
order to avoid evils which he considered more harmful. Necessity,
therefore, which involved a choice of evils, was an appropriate defense.
Lovercamp and Unger Reconciled
The court in Lovercamp had emphasized that the defense must be
extremely limited in order to protect the rights and interests of soci-
ety. ' 39 The Unger court concluded, however, that demanding absolute
satisfaction of the five Lovercamp preconditions 40 was overly restric-
tive. The majority felt that it could not hold that each of those ele-
ments must be present to establish a meritorious necessity defense.
Instead, it chose to view those criteria merely as relevant factors to be
used in assessing the weight and credibility of the defense, not its ad-
missibility. 4'
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-11 (1973) recognizes duress if the defendant "reasonably
believes death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him if he does not perform such con-
duct." It does not require that the coercive force actually demand that the defendant perform
that act. See note 31 supra.
137. 66 I11. 2d at 340, 362 N.E.2d at 322.
138. Accord, People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969); State v.
Pearson, 15 Utah 2d 353, 393 P.2d 390 (1964). In Pearson the court commented, "As much as
one might commiserate with the defendant's plight, it remains the fact that he did not escape
because he feared his life to be in danger ihe refused to do so. His act of escape was the result of
a voluntary decision of his own." Id at 354, 393 P.2d at 391.
139. One commentator has argued that the five Lovercamp conditions which must be satis-
fied for the defense to be available are needed to avoid the "vague, pervasive, and unpredictable
aspects of the defense at common law." 9 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 466, 479 (1976).
140. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
141. Unger would have been barred from submitting a necessity defense if he had been
required to satisfy the Lovercamp criteria. Unger did not complain to prison authorities follow-
ing the first sexual attack, even though he had earlier requested and been granted a transfer from
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In doing so, the Unger court adopted a more liberal approach to
the problem of balancing prisoners' rights against societal interests than
did previous courts. The Unger court apparently did not fear as much
as previous courts the anticipated ramifications of widespread use of
the necessity defense: threats to public safety and efficient prison opera-
tions. In contrast to earlier emphasis on the very limited character of
the newly recognized defense, the Unger court placed no restrictions
upon the availability of the defense other than the requirement of pro-
duction by the defendant of some evidence to support his argument.
42
The believability of the defendant's contentions and the ultimate suc-
cess of the offered defense were questions which were to be submitted
to the discrimination of the jury.
Justice Underwood, dissenting in Unger, expressed an "uneasy
feeling" 14 3 that the Illinois court may have tipped the scales too far in
favor of prisoners' interests and consequently sown the "seeds of future
troubles""' by encouraging potential escapees and, thus, disrupting
prison discipline. Whether the Illinois Supreme Court has opened a
Pandora's Box of prison escape defense claims in Illinois remains to be
seen.
Other courts are unlikely to embrace a policy which so greatly fa-
cilitates prison escape defenses. Undoubtedly the courts will be
swayed by the ever-present fear of opening the "floodgates of litiga-
tion." Moreover, judicial recognition of prisoners' rights has not yet
proceeded to the extent of outweighing other, more established, doc-
trines. Traditional notions of administrative autonomy, judicial absten-
tion and strict prison discipline, as well as society's desire to remove
criminals from public sight and public consciousness, remain firmly
implanted in the judiciary's attitude towards prisoners, and are certain
to prevail in most instances in the near future.
Undoubtedly, the courts will be concerned with the consequences
of encouraging escape. Not all escapes are free from violence. An
increase in escapes means an increase in injuries to prisoners and inno-
cent people. Increased violence-assaults, gunfights, etc.-is apt to
raise the level of tension within the penitentiaries, thereby further sub-
his former prison quarters because of a homosexual assault. Nor did he immediately report to the
authorities when he had reached a place of safety. Rather, he stole a truck, drove to Chicago,
then to St. Charles, and was apprehended two days later attempting to contact friends in Canada.
33 Ill. App. 3d at 771, 338 N.E.2d at 443.
142. An Illinois defendant, in order to raise an affirmative defense such as necessity, must
present some evidence thereon. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-2 (1971). "Only very slight evidence"
is necessary. 33 Ill. App. 3d at 772, 338 N.E.2d at 444.
143. 66 Ill. 2d at 343, 362 N.E.2d at 324.
144. Id at 343-44, 362 N.E.2d at 324.
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verting discipline. Inmates who believe that there is a legal justifica-
tion for their escape perhaps will be less reluctant to use violence to
implement their exits.
For these reasons Unger is unlikely to have a profound impact
upon other jurisdictions. The trend appears to be towards a very lim-
ited recognition of the necessity defense, restricted by the Lovercamp
criteria or comparable qualifications. Most courts have expressed deep
concern about swinging the pendulum too far in favor of the prisoners.
They are unlikely to follow the Illinois approach of virtually un-
restricted access to the necessity defense.
Unger indeed may have gone a little too far. While it is unlikely to
incite a "rash of escapes,"' 4 5 it could contribute to an increase in illegit-
imate escape defenses, some of which, at least, are bound to succeed.
Many defendants will be able to go straight from the prison gates to the
jury. No threshold criteria are available to screen out obviously fraudu-
lent claims and discourage potential escapees from gambling upon a
successful escape, banking on their ability to persuade a jury.
On the other hand, other recent decisions which follow the seminal
Lovercamp opinion do not go far enough to make the necessity defense
available."4 These courts have been too cautious. Their long-culti-
vated fear of allowing any defenses to escape has resulted in the verbal
recognition of a defense which in practice will be useless in all but the
most extreme cases. The inevitable result can only be to exclude legiti-
mate claims and unjustly relegate those prisoners to the horrors of ho-
mosexual molestation and other mistreatment.
The dichotomy of approaches to this issue easily can be reconciled.
The conditions established by the Lovercamp court should be utilized
to deter potential escapees and weed out illegitimate defenses, but the
criteria should be modified. Instead of applying overly restrictive re-
quirements of immediacy, the courts should adopt a standard of rea-
sonableness. A defendant should be required to offer some evidence
that (1) his escape was predicated upon a fear of attack within the rea-
sonably near future, (2) there was no time for other legal remedies, (3)
the escape was executed with reasonable force, and (4) the defendant
afterwards surrendered within a reasonable period of time.
Such criteria would eliminate most frivolous and unsupported de-
fenses, but would not exclude legitimate claims deserving of jury reso-
lution. A judicial doctrine can be developed which recognizes that
145. People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 303, 170 N.W.2d 916, 918 (1969).
146. Even in California, where Lovercamp first legitimatized the defense, recent arguments
of necessity have failed. See People v. Wheeler, 68 Cal. App. 3d 1056, 137 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1977).
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certain circumstances justify one's decision to escape from prison, with-
out defining those circumstances so narrowly as to inevitably preclude
any utilization of that doctrine. While some illegitimate claims un-
doubtedly will get to the jury, allowing the fact-finding process to weed
them out is more desirable than denying actual victims an opportunity
to justify their escapes.
CONCLUSION
While the courts increasingly have acknowledged that prison in-
mates retain certain civil rights, they have denied until quite recently
that a prisoner may be justified, under certain circumstances, in escap-
ing from his confinement. In the last few years a number of state
courts have ruled that escapees should not be punished if the circum-
stances of the escape fall within the limits of the common law notions
of duress or necessity.
While a dramatic increase in the recognition of these defenses is
unmistakable, most courts have emphasized that such defenses are ex-
tremely limited. So far, only a very few defendants have succeeded in
getting their claims to the jury. Traditional fears of undermined prison
discipline and courts deluged by unjustified claims of coercion continue
to dominate judicial thought.
However, there is an increasing propensity towards regarding pris-
oners on a more humanistic level. There is no longer the same indif-
ference to the plight of helpless prisoners subjected to inhumane and
intolerable conditions. The recent shift in emphasis from the duress
defense to necessity further signifies increasing judicial enlightenment
and concern for prisoners' rights. Escapes from threats of homosexual
attack are less frequently being viewed as acts committed without free
will, compelled by an irresistable force which overcomes the mind of
the escapee. The courts now are beginning to realize that such escapes
are conscious choices intended to minimize social and individual harm
and, therefore, acts which should be socially, morally, and legally con-
doned.
The unique "hands off" approach which in the past created a dif-
ferent legal standard for prisoners than for others in society appears to
be waning. Yet, because of the peculiar circumstances of prison escape
cases, there should be a different standard, although not the traditional
one: the courts should establish some guidelines with which they can
more accurately judge whether the duress or necessity defenses are jus-
tified. The recent Unger case may have gone too far to incite unjusti-
fied escapes and illegitimate defenses. On the other hand, the
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Lovercamp holding is overly restrictive and will prevent legitimate
claims from being heard by the jury. Standards of reasonableness
would more equitably balance and protect the interests of the prisoners
and society at large.
The recent acknowledgment of prison escape defenses raises some
new issues beyond the scope of this note, and resurrects other questions
for further attention. For example, what is the liability of a public
officer or public body for the harm done by a prisoner permitted to
escape? To what extent are prison authorities liable for injury to a
prisoner caused by the assault of another prisoner? To what extent is
the judiciary obligated to protect a justified escapee from being re-
turned to the same, or a similar, environment, and how can this be
accomplished? The courts increasingly will have to confront these is-
sues as they are faced with a rising tide of prisoner grievance litigation.
Most of the recent escape cases have concerned homosexual as-
sault. A few have extended to conditions of inadequate or denied
medical treatment. The courts now should recognize that there is no
justification for limiting escape defenses to these areas. Escape from
any type of intolerable condition may be justified. Reliance on the
traditional role of the jury and use of an equitable standard of reasona-
bleness will adequately protect the public interest without sacrificing
prisoners' rights.
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